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Now for a final word concerning Copyright and Related Topics
as a whole: The enactment of a new copyright statute, though it
would effect many important changes in the present law, would
do little to detract from the value of the articles in this collection;
they will continue to serve as instructive and provocative guides
on some of the most fundamental principles underlying the copy-
right system. The new law will be best understood, of course, by
those who can see its roots and the forces of reason and experience
that made it grow as it did. As for the articles on "related topics"-
the development of rights and remedies respecting privacy and the
use of titles, names, symbols, personalities, spectacles, and ideas
having promotional or trade value-they also have much of lasting
interest in tracing the theories on which the law in these adjacent
fields is evolving.
In sum, this volume of selected articles will provide, for those
who are not specialists in the copyright field, an informative and
stimulating tour of the country. And the specialist, who may have
read most of the articles individually in the past, is likely to find that
two or three of them escaped him before and that others are well
worth re-reading; for him too this volume offers the convenience
of placing within ready reach some of the choicest material on the
subject.
ABE A. GOLDMAN*
THE SCIENnFIC ESTATE. By Don K. Price.t Cambridge: The Belk-
nap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 323. $5.95.
The Dean of the Harvard University Graduate School of
Public Administration has written a long essay considering the
impact of the scientific-technological revolution on the American
politico-economic structure. In The Scientific Estate Dean Price asks
"the fundamental question: how is science, with all its new power, to
be related to our political purposes and values, and to our economic
and constitutional system?"' The problems posed and the answers
suggested form a provocative and important book deserving wide
readership-not only by scientists; but also by lawyers, political
scientists and economists. Commenting on the book, scientist Dael
* General Counsel of the Copyright Office. The views expressed herein are those
of the writer personally and do not necessarily reflect views of the Copyright Office.
J-Dean, Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University.
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Wolfle has said, "The political theorists who wrote the U.S. Con-
stitution sought to protect a democratic government and society
against the then major sources of power: property, the military,
and the church. Since that time, science and technology have be-
come important sources of power. How would the Founding
Fathers have handled this problem? It is at this general and funda-
mental level that Price considers the relations between scientists
and government and the problem of keeping the growing influence
of science compatible with representative government."'2 I hasten
to add that in my judgment Dr. Wolfie's history is at least ques-
tionable and probably erroneous. The founding fathers did not
protect a "democratic" society against "property" and the "church."
Quite the contrary. But the question he asks, nevertheless, is
pertinent.
About the turn of the century Holmes presciently observed that
the lawyer of the future was not to be the man versed in the black-
letter law but rather he was to be the expert in economics and sta-
tistics. Such is the case, now that the Holmesian future has arrived.
Increasingly the important work that lawyers do is concerned not
only with norms imbedded in code, case and compilation of doctrine
but also with the economics and politics of societal decisions. This,
put another way, is merely to note that public law has become the
dominant segment of law; it is all-pervasive, working immense
changes in the nature of private law while impinging more and
more directly upon individuals and collectivities.3 It has now be-
come evident that the further dimension of science and technology
is being added to the corpus of knowledge of which the lawyer must
be cognizant if he is to function in the present-day and emergent so-
ciety. In many respects this book poses significant challenges for
legal educators which in themselves suggest a need for curricular
change. However, the response to date of the law schools has been
just as disappointing as it has been in reacting to the analogous need
for insight into the political economy of human affairs of which
Holmes spoke.4 It is clear enough-at least, it should be clear enough,
OWolfle, Editorial: A New Level of Understanding, 150 SCIENCE 693 (1965).
On the importance of public law, see Linde, Justice Douglas on Liberty in the
Welfare State: Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10 (1965);
Miller, The Impact of Public Law on Legal Education, 12 J. LEGAL ED. 483 (1960);
Reich, The New Property, 73 YArE L.J. 733 (1964).
'Compare Estep, International Lawmakers in a Technological World: Space Com-
munications and Nuclear Energy, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 162 (1964), with Beresford,
Lawyers, Science, and the Government, 33 GEo. WASH. L. RFv. 181 (1964).
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although one should not be sanguine on the matter-that science and
technology pose new and critical problems for legal education. 5 Legal
education exists for a purpose larger than annually turning out a few
thousand technicians in legal "doctrine," however defined. I sug-
gest that this "doctrine" must include reference to both social and
natural science.6 Lawyers and law professors must also be concerned
with a condition described by Dr. Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: "The capacity of the democratic,
representative systems of government to cope with the problems
raised by the scientific revolution is in question.' 7
When President Eisenhower, in his farewell address, warned the
country that public policy might "become the captive of a scientific-
technological elite," he was not speaking lightly. He was par-
ticularly disturbed with the prospect of alliances between the scien-
tists and a "military-industrial elite" to control public policy.8 It
was a shock for scientists, as it was for business leaders and some
military personnel, to be linked by a conservative President in a
new "estate" of the realm. Indeed, it should have been not only
a shock but a challenge to all who are concerned with the political
process in this nation-and what lawyer is not? It is the great merit
of The Scientific Estate that in it Dean Price elevates and illuminates
our understanding of the relation of science to democratic govern-
ment. "The scientific revolution," Price asserts, "seems certain to
have a more radical effect on our political institutions than did the
industrial revolution, for a good many reasons."9 These include:
(a) the fusion of political and economic power; that is, the public
5 See Estep, supra note 4, at 162: "[C]onsidering the rapid technological development
and the wholly new sciences and technologies which have arisen just since World
War II, present law school curricula constitute an amazing indictment of legal edu-
cation, or at least a dramatic demonstration of the fact that, in bringing the law
.up to date' in areas such as administrative law and judicial administration, the very
institutions which are supposed to be preparing the leaders of tomorrow's bar are
failing to take account of these new developments [in science and technology] which
inevitably have an impact upon the law and demand some kind of legal control."
At the risk of excessive loyalty to my own institution, I should like to call at-
tention to a Program in Law, Science, and Technology recently established at The
George Washington University under the direction of Professor Harold P. Green.
Other law schools which have dealt to a limited extent with law and science include
Yale, Illinois, U.C.L.A., Michigan and Western Reserve.
6 See Miller, On the Interdependence of Law and the Behavioral Sciences, 43 TEXAS
L. REv. 1094 (1965).
RABINOWiTCH, THE SCIENTFIc REVOLuInON (1963), quoted in Piucz, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 10.
8 N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1961, p. 22, cols. 4-5.
9 PRicE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 15.
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and private sectors of American society are growing closer together;
(b) a new order of complexity in the administration of public af-
fairs; and (c) the fundamental system of checks and balances is
being upset. The significance of this for the public-law specialist is
obvious, and is summed up by Price's statement: "the main lines of
our [public] policy, over the long run, are likely to be determined by
scientific developments that we cannot foresee, rather than by
political doctrines that we can now state."'10 The translation of these
scientific developments into official decisions-legislative, admin-
istrative, judicial-is now and will in the future be the work of
lawyers. As Price says, "science alone cannot solve political prob-
lems""1-although at times some appear to disagree.
In matters of public policy the problem is one of "managing"
change, for change is built into the social system by science and
technology. We shall be in trouble if reliance for this task of man-
aging change is placed upon the scientist and technologist, for
neither has much appreciation for or even knowledge of the values
subsumed under the concept of human dignity. An exception might
be made, of course, for those scientists who publish in the Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists. Unhappily, however, they are balanced
by many non-scientists, such as some economists, who tend to outdo
the natural scientists in being non- and anti-humanistic. Exclusive
reliance on science is dangerous because it does not provide a body
of set truths that can serve as a basis for political, i.e., legal action.
"The main philosophical threat to our freedom is not that science
will tempt us to invent a new materialist dialectic, or establish a
'1984' style dictatorship. It is rather that if we rely on science alone
we will be left with no sense of the purpose of existence, and thus
no basis for determining our political goals to guide the blind forces
of applied technology.' 2 Dean Price wants the scientist to play an
active role in government and the politician to take a sympathetic
interest in science and scientific institutions. We have yet to learn
to control in a responsible manner the technological forces released
into society and have no new system of values by which to judge
these forces.
In some respects, the challenges Price poses for the scientist and
politician-of control over technology and of attaining a sense of
'Old. at 186. (Emphasis added.)
"IId. at 162.
12 Id. at 107.
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purpose-seem to raise questions similar to those which lawyers have
traditionally been called upon by the American people to resolve.
The central position of the lawyer in this country has long been
noted, particularly in the governmental processes. In recent years,
though, a tendency to call upon others like the economist or scien-
tist has become evident.13 Lawyers have been our generalists in
policy-making positions both in and out of government. Whether
or not they can continue in such a position is one challenge Price
impliedly presents to the legal profession. Whether it will be met
or not is unanswered; the legal profession and legal education seems
to be curiously moribund. In a world characterized by rapid change,
"lawyerdom" is not moving with the alacrity of celerity necessary
to keep up. Lawyers still fly backwards and seek to answer today's
problems with the solutions of yesteryear. But in fact the very ex-
istence of a problem means that the answers of yesteryear are suspect
or in need of reexamination. The legal profession has no institu-
tionalized method of self-analysis, which would enable it to de-
termine whether it is adequately meeting the tasks presented by
society. Chaos lies all about us: delay in the courts, politicization
of the administrative process, breakdown of respect for law, rise in
crime, to name but a few examples. The old order is changing and
lawyers seem fated to be spectators rather than participants.
If lawyers were to become participants-as they should, particularly
those connected with public law and with the law schools-attention
must be accorded to such matters as the assimilation of scientific
and technological knowledge into the legal processes. We per-
sistently try to solve the problems of today with the tools of yester-
day, despite the fact that they are not working. This is true both
in the detailed routine of the law, particularly in courts, and in the
larger questions of public-policy making. In addition, lawyers must
face the question of "purposiveness," that is, the ends and goals of
society must be considered and the conclusions and policies result-
ing must be those which are most likely to fulfill those ends and
goals. This calls for a new "breed of man," a new type of thinking. 4
" Price indicates the extent to which scientists occupy positions of power. See also
LAPP, THE NEW PRIESTHOOD: THE SCIENTIFIC ELITE AND THE USE OF POWER (1965).
On economists, a lawyer interested in the governmental process might well ponder
NOVICK, PROGRAM BUDGETING (1965), and PLANNING-PROGRAMMING-BUDGETING (Bureau
of the Budget Bulletin No. 66-3, 1965).
14 See Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy Decision Process: Alternative Thinking and the
Predictive Function, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 318 (1964).
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However, one looks in vain to the legal profession for more than
sporadic, occasional attention to such matters. Certainly the prac-
ticing bar is doing little or nothing. Try to learn, for example, how
that pillar of baroque orthodoxy, the American Bar Association,
meets the burgeoning problems of the day. If one has the viscera
to withstand reading the American Bar Association Journal, par-
ticularly the statements of the presidents of the ABA, one would
wonder whether the leaders of the bar are living on the same planet
where science and technology are transforming the face and nature
of the earth, posing crucial problems to man, and disrupting time-
honored political and economic institutions. With some exceptions,
the same may be said for the academic branch of the profession, as
witness any annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, or much of what is published in the Journal of Legal Edu-
cation.
The American people are not receiving what they should from
the legal profession. Study any one of the great, pressing problems
of the day and one soon concludes that the lawyer's contribution is
minimal at best. Population control, environmental pollution, vio-
lence in the international community, all of which have scientific
roots, find lawyers silent or at least speaking with muted tones. Yet
the question of population growth is as explosive as any in the world,
atmospheric and other pollution can blight the landscape, and war
can obliterate man.
Other problems obtrude. The position of the Negro in our so-
ciety, surely the most polycentric of all social questions, is far from
settled.15 Still lawyers have little to say. A proliferating govern-
ment characterized at times by unrestrained discretion intrudes more
and more into the interstices of society and everyday affairs of Ameri-
cans. But lawyers have little to say.16 There is no established means
by which many major public-policy issues can be debated prior to
promulgation. 17 Lawyers could and should do this-but, they have
not responded.
""See BENNETT, CONFRONTATION: BLACK AND WHrE (1966); Miller, Book Review, 18
J. LEGAL ED. 363 (1966).
"Attempts by the academicians to grapple with the complexities of the control of
discretion in the bureaucracy may be found in DAVIs, ADmINIST AVE LAW TEXT § 4
(2d ed. 1959), DAvis, ADMINISATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 4.13-.14 (1958, Supp. 1965), and
DAVISON & GRUNDSTMIN, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAw 601 (1952). Cf. Miller, The Public Interest
Undefined, 10 J. PUB. L. 184 (1961).
17 This means that in many portentous areas we now have government by fait
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Lawyers, in short, are losing caste in this country. Dean Price
documents some of what has taken place. His book should be
required reading in all law schools and should be the subject of
faculty seminars and discussions. This, one may be sure, will not
be done. There is little evidence of any real awareness within the
legal profession of the truly revolutionary society in which we live.
Lawyers are not dinosaurs; they will not disappear. But they will
continue to become mere legal mechanics as the bar becomes more
and more deprofessionalized-unless and until a breakthrough is
made to a new order of viewing the human condition. It must be
remembered that when President Eisenhower warned against a
"scientific-technological elite" he made no mention of lawyers. I do
not suggest that lawyers should strive to be a part of this elite as an
end in itself; but I do suggest that lawyers had better begin to learn
what the scientists, technologists and economists are doing. If the
study of law were to encompass more than the traditional abstract
legal lore so long the fancy of hornbook writers and others, 8 then it
could become the technique through which humanistic values
will be preserved in a society dominated by the non- and anti-human-
ists. The end and purpose of law, in addition, of course, to its norma-
tive, ordering function, is that of infusing humanism into cold
rationalism. We have lost, or are losing, that ability. It is being
replaced by a naive faith in science which has become the new estate
of the realm, equipped with a priesthood 19 and a corpus of esotery
known only to that priesthood. Just as lawyers replaced the clergy,
accompli. Compare, in this regard, the decision by President Kennedy to put an
American on the moon by 1970 with that by President Johnson to escalate the "war"
in Vietnam.
18 In 1886 Holmes said: "If your subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology,
the sciences of man, to political economy, the theory of legislation, ethics, and thus
by several paths to your final view of life.... To be master of any branch of knowl-
edge, you must master those which lie next to it; and thus to know anything you
must know all." Speech by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., entitled The Profession of the
Law, Feb. 17, 1886, to Harvard University, in SPE.ECHEs 22 (1913). See Reich, Toward
the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YAix L.J. 1402 (1965).
10 See LAPP, op. cit.. supra note 13,. at 29: "No one-not even the most brilliant
scientist alive today-really knows where science is taking us. We are aboard a
train which is gathering speed, racing down a track on which there are an unknown
number of switches leading to unknown destinations. No single scientist is in the
engine cab and there may be demons at the switch. Most of society is in the caboose
looking backward."
See Born, Reflections, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov. 1965, p. 3, at 5: "My
thesis [is] that science and technology have destroyed the ethical basis of civilization,
perhaps irreparably ...."
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so now the scientists, natural and behavioral, are replacing the
lawyer. The technocrats have arrived and are taking over.20
ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER*
2OAn example of how science and technology are making obsolescent, even ob-
solete, many of the skills and techniques of yesteryear is a finding of the Wall Street
Journal that many business executives cannot adjust to business permutations be-
cause they have not kept up with a changing world. See Wall Street Journal, Jan. 24,
1966, p. 1, col. 6.
* A.B. 1938 Williamette University; LL.B. 1949 Stanford University; J.S.D. 1959
Yale University; Professor of Law, The George Washington University.
